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In 2016, two former Google employees founded Airfox with a 
mission to provide financial services to emerging markets.1 After 
completing incubating rounds at TechStars Boston and Harvard’s 
Innovation Lab, they developed their idea: users would earn 
money by interacting with advertisements on their phones; then, if 
those users opted to share their device data and browsing behavior, 
they could build a credit history and apply for microloans.2 To 
create a payment network that could cheaply and reliably handle 
thousands of microtransactions between lenders, advertisers, and 
users from across the globe, Airfox turned to one of the hottest new 
technological trends: blockchain. 
Specifically, Airfox wanted to create a digital asset (also called 
a “token” or “coin”) using a blockchain. The token, which was 
named AirToken, would essentially be the currency required to 
participate in Airfox’s network.3 When users watched 
advertisements, they would receive AirTokens from advertisers. 
When users requested loans, they would receive AirTokens from 
lenders. These AirTokens could be cashed out for fiat currency or 
redeemed for cellular data and other goods from companies that 
accepted AirTokens. Thanks to the decentralized nature of 
blockchain, all these assorted parties would interact directly with 
each other and not with Airfox itself.4 
In 2017, Airfox held an initial coin offering (ICO) for its 
application. In the ICO, investors gave money to Airfox in exchange 
for promises to receive AirTokens once Airfox developed the 
application.5 Airfox’s legal advisors felt confident that they would 
avoid securities issues because they were distributing utility tokens, 
which are redeemable for goods or services, instead of security 
	
 1.  AirFox Raises $15 Million in Successful ICO, Brings New Mobile Banking Solutions to 
Emerging Markets, BUSINESS WIRE (October 10, 2017), https://www.businesswire. 
com/news/home/20171010005598/en/AirFox-Raises-15-Million-Successful-ICO-Brings 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
 2.  AirToken (AIR): The Token for Mobile Access, AIRFOX (Aug. 21, 2017)  
[hereinafter Airfox White Paper] at 3–4, available at https://icosbull.com/eng/ico/ 
airtoken/whitepaper. 
 3.  Id. at 3, 5–6 (describing the roles of users, carriers, advertisers, and publishers in 
the network). 
 4.  For a slightly more detailed introduction to blockchain, see infra, Part II.A. 
 5.  For a slightly more detailed explanation of initial coin offerings, see infra Part II.B. 
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tokens, which are representative of shares in a company’s profits.6 
Within two months, Airfox raised $15 million from over 2,500 
investors.7 At a time when the volatile ICO market was plagued 
with scams and fraud, this accredited start-up was considered a 
shining example of a successful ICO.8 
The problem was that Airfox’s legal advisors were wrong. On 
November 16, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
announced that AirTokens were securities and that Airfox had 
violated securities laws by failing to register them.9 In its settlement 
with the SEC, Airfox agreed to refund investors, pay a  
$250,000 fine, register AirTokens as securities, and file all of the 
SEC’s required disclosures for the rest of Airfox’s meaningful 
existence.10 On that same day, the SEC sanctioned another 
blockchain company that had also conducted an ICO, requiring 
those exact same concessions.11 
The SEC’s crackdown on ICOs was not a surprise. For a while, 
the SEC had been suggesting that ICOs were most likely securities 
offerings.12 However, in a small but important way, the 
enforcement actions seemingly contradicted statements that SEC 
officials had made just a few months earlier. 
In April 2018, the Chairman of the SEC, Jay Clayton, gave a 
speech about regulating digital assets.13 Clayton compared utility 
	
 6.  Ben Munster, Exclusive: Airfox CEO Says ICO Regulations Clearer After SEC 
Settlement—But Not for Everybody, DECRYPT (Nov. 29, 2018), https://decryptmedia.com/ 
2018/11/29/exclusive-Airfox-ceo-says-ico-regulations-still-unclear-after-sec-settlement/. 
 7.  AirFox Raises $15 Million in Successful ICO, Brings New Mobile Banking Solutions to 
Emerging Markets, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.businesswire.com/news/ 
home/20171010005598/en/Airfox-Raises-15-Million-Successful-ICO-Brings (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2019). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  CarrierEQ, Inc., d/b/a Airfox, Securities Act Release No. 10575, SEC (Nov. 16, 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10575.pdf [hereinafter Airfox 
Order]. 
 10.  Id. at 8–10. 
 11.  Paragon Coin, Inc,  Securities Act Release No. 10574, SEC (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10574.pdf. 
 12.  See SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO, Release No. 81207, 11–15 (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf; Munchee Inc., Securities Act 
Release No. 10445, 8–9, SEC (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ 
2017/33-10445.pdf. 
 13.  Nikhilesh De, SEC Chief Touts Benefits of Crypto Regulation, COINDESK (Apr. 5, 
2018), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-not-icos-bad. 
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tokens to laundromat coins. If someone buys several coins from a 
laundromat that has yet to be developed, with the intent to sell the 
coins at a higher price to others, then those coins are securities. But 
if someone buys a coin simply to wash her clothes at the new 
laundromat, then that coin is not a security. According to Clayton, 
“[t]he use [of the laundry coin] can evolve toward or away from a 
security.”14 When it comes to utility tokens, a security today is not 
necessarily a security tomorrow.15 
In June 2018, the Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporate 
Finance, William Hinman, also spoke about regulating digital 
assets.16 Hinman suggested that tokens could become so 
decentralized over time that regulating them as securities may not 
be required.17 He even opined that ether, the token of the popular 
Ethereum network that is used to create self-executing contracts, 
was too decentralized to be a security.18 This statement was 
significant because ether, like AirTokens and hundreds of other 
digital assets, had initially raised funds in an ICO.19 
The SEC’s enforcement actions are somewhat inconsistent with 
the earlier statements of its officials. Chairman Clayton and 
Director Hinman had both suggested that a utility token, by its use 
or by its lack of centralization, could potentially outgrow securities 
regulations after its ICO. But in its November 2018 settlements, the 
SEC required issuers of utility tokens to comply with securities 
regulations for practically forever.20 This discrepancy asks the 
question: Is it really ever possible for a digital asset to start out as a 
security and eventually transform into a non-security? Looking at 
recent judicial decisions, administrative guidance, blockchain 
	
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  William Hinman, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic), SEC 
(June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Vitalik Buterin, Launching the Ether Sale, ETHEREUM BLOG (July 22, 2014), 
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/22/launching-the-ether-sale/. The ether ICO was 
called a “pre-sale”, but it functioned equivalently as an ICO. 
 20.  The settlements require the companies to comply with disclosure requirements 
until either (a) there are less than 300 users holding tokens or (b) there are less than 500 users 
holding tokens and the company’s total assets have been less than $10 million for three years. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (2016). See Airfox Order, supra note 9, at 9. 
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functionality, and practices of blockchain developers, the answer is 
complicated: theoretically yes, but practically no. 
Much of the literature applying securities law to utility tokens 
has focused on whether the initial distribution of the token makes 
it a security. This Note, however, discusses whether securities 
regulations can and should continue to apply to a blockchain 
network’s digital assets even after its ICO has been deemed a 
security offering. Part II further introduces blockchain technology 
and ICOs. Part III discusses the SEC’s current regulations and how 
they are incompatible with the functionality and purposes of 
blockchain applications. Part IV outlines the two tests used to 
determine whether something is a security: the Howey test and the 
risk capital test. Part V reviews the SEC’s treatment of ICOs as 
security offerings and why courts have agreed with the regulators. 
Part VI presents two theories for how and when digital assets can 
transform from securities into non-securities. The Part ultimately 
pushes back on each theory by identifying practical aspects of 
blockchain applications that are inconsistent with the theoretical 
arguments. Part VII concludes this Note by suggesting that 
proponents of utility tokens would profit more by focusing on how 
to modify securities law to accommodate digital assets, instead of 
trying to escape regulation under existing securities law. 
I. A DIGITAL ASSETS PRIMER: BLOCKCHAINS AND ICOS 
Applying securities law to utility tokens requires a general 
understanding of how blockchain technology works and how ICOs 
fit within the blockchain model. This Part provides a very basic 
familiarity with these innovations. 
A. Blockchain Technology 
A blockchain is a comprehensive list of all the accounts in a 
particular network and all the transactions to ever take place 
between those accounts. It is constantly updated and publicly 
visible to all users. Because each user shares a complete record of 
all account balances and past transactions, there is no need for an 
intermediary to verify that transactions are complete, or to prevent 
users from fraudulently double-spending, or to transfer a payment 
through other networks to the payee’s account. Users transact 
directly with each other. The decentralized blockchain network 
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cuts out the middleman, allowing for lower transaction costs and 
simpler global transactions.21 
The users with positive balances in their accounts can use their 
digital assets, sometimes called “tokens” or “coins,” to purchase 
whatever goods and services that particular blockchain allows 
sellers to offer, such as computer storage22 or restaurant dinners.23 
Holders of those tokens may also receive certain rights, such as the 
ability to upload content or access a certain website. Tokens with 
these sorts of functionality are often referred to as “utility tokens” 
or “consumptive tokens.” Other tokens represent a share of 
ownership in a company, just like traditional stocks. These 
“security tokens” often act like traditional stocks, giving holders a 
right to vote on the decisions of the venture and to receive a share 
of the venture’s profits.24 Tokens may have both consumer-like and 
shareholder-like features.25 
A functional blockchain is decentralized in the sense that 
anyone selling goods and services or buying those goods and 
services are exchanging exclusively and directly with each other, as 
opposed to through a third party. But developers are not 
completely hands-off once the network is functioning. The 
developers might still make small changes, such as change the 
application’s user interface, increase the minimum transaction size, 
or fix small bugs. The developers might also make large changes, 
such as modify how each transaction is verified, undo a permanent 
transaction, or revert to a previous block of transactions on the 
	
 21.  Vinay Gupta, The Promise of Blockchain is a World Without Middlemen, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-promise-of-blockchain-is-a-world-
without-middlemen. 
 22.  Filecoin is used on a network for buying and selling computer storage. See Protocol 
Labs, Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network, FILECOIN (July 19, 2017), 
https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf. 
 23.  Munchee designed a token to be used as payment for restaurant reviews. 
Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, SEC (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf. 
 24.  See Rohit Kulkarni, Security Tokens Set to Take Center Stage in 2019, NASDAQ (June 
22, 2018), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/security-tokens-set-to-take-center-stage-in-
2019-cm982207. 
 25.  For an additional description of utility tokens and security tokens, see Nate 
Crosser, Initial Coin Offerings as Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility Tokens Securities?, 
67 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 391–94 (2018). 
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blockchain.26 To remain compatible and functional after these large 
changes occur, all of the users must update to the most recent 
version of the software and ensure that they are using the exact 
same list of balances and transactions as everyone else.27 
Apart from the developers, another group of people who make 
the blockchain function are the transaction validators. Validators 
spend their own resources to process all the network’s transactions 
and permanently add them to the blockchain’s complete list of past 
transactions. In return for their work, validators receive more of 
that blockchain’s token. The validators are not always the same as 
the developers; often, anyone can be a validator. 
Each blockchain system has its own method of consensus, which 
determines how the transactions are verified and which validator 
is selected to do the work (and reap the reward).28 In proof-of-work 
methods, validators compete against each other to solve a complex 
math problem first: the winner adds the transactions and gets the 
payment. In proof-of-stake methods, the validator is randomly 
selected based on how much of the blockchain’s token it already 
owns. This works because they would have to forfeit their tokens if 
anything nefarious occurred during the verification. Other 
blockchains are permissioned systems, which designate only certain 
people or entities to do the validations. Developers are frequently 
implementing hybrids or variations of the above methods or 
devising new consensus mechanisms.29 
	
 26.  See, e.g., Jake Frankenfield, Hard Fork (Blockchain), INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hard-fork.asp; Rachel Rose O’Leary, Ethereum 
Developers Move to Alter Blockchain’s Economics in Next Upgrade, COINDESK (Aug. 31,  
2018, 3:53 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-developers-move-to-reduce-new-
cryptocurrency-creation (discussing upcoming changes in the Ethereum blockchain that 
alters how much new ether gets distributed). 
 27.  Catherine Tims, What Happens During a Cryptocurrency Hard Fork?, CRYPTOS R US 
(Feb. 9, 2018), https://cryptosrus.com/what-happens-during-a-cryptocurrency-hard-fork/. 
 28.  Ameer Rosic, Basic Primer: Blockchain Consensus Protocol, BLOCKGEEKS (2017), 
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/blockchain-consensus/. See also Peter Van Valkenburgh, 
Framework for Securities Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, COIN CENTER (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://coincenter.org/entry/framework-for-securities-regulation-of-cryptocurrencies 
(discussing proof-of-work, proof-of-stake, and permissioned methods of consensus, as well 
as hybrids of those types). 
 29.  See Vaibhav Saini, ConsensusPedia: An Encyclopedia of 30+ Consensus Algorithms, 
HACKERNOON (June 26, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/consensuspedia-an-encyclopedia-
of-29-consensus-algorithms-e9c4b4b7d08f (listing about thirty different consensus 
algorithms, with pros and cons for each). 
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B. Initial Coin Offerings 
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) typically begin with a PDF. 
Inventors with an idea for an interesting and valuable application 
of blockchain technology write a paper detailing the idea, create a 
website, and then publish their paper. They then request money, in 
exchange for a promise of coins, tokens, or other digital assets. 
Developers use those funds to program the application itself. After 
a couple of years of development and working out the kinks in the 
application, the blockchain will go live. Upon initialization, it will 
contain positive balances for the investors who contributed money 
during the ICO (and usually for the developers themselves) and 
will begin recording transactions between the users. 
There are a number of advantages to ICOs.30 First, they reach an 
enormous number of potential investors. Anyone with an internet 
connection can donate, regardless of economic status or geographic 
location. This expansive reach suits the functionality of the 
blockchain application, which is also accessible and usable by 
anyone anywhere with internet access. Second, they require almost 
zero capital to conduct. The ICO market is an ideal meritocracy, 
requiring only a bright idea, an explanatory write-up (also known 
as a white paper), and perhaps a website where the idea can be 
further illustrated and advertised. With an ICO, it does not take 
money to make money. 
But the lack of barriers to entry creates a foreseeable problem: 
some people enter the ICO market who should not have entered. 
Perhaps they lack the ability to actually implement their ambitious 
idea. Or maybe they are scammers and never intended to create a 
functioning blockchain in the first place. These problems make it 
possible that those donors, who could be anyone, anywhere with 
internet access, may lose their money without ever seeing a 
functional coin or token returned to them. Luckily for those 
unfortunate investors, and (perhaps) unluckily for blockchain 
application developers, there is a large organization whose sole 
purpose is to prevent those kinds of busts: the Securities and 
Exchanges Commission. 
	
 30.  See, e.g., Matthew J. Higgins, Munchee Inc.: A Turning Point for the Cryptocurrency 
Industry, 97 N.C. L. REV. 220, 220–21 (2018) (comparing ICOs to other ways of raising capital 
such as IPOs, which are extremely expensive, and venture capital funding, which often 
require ceding some ownership and control). 
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II.  SECURITIES REGULATIONS: REQUIREMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS 
The mission of the Securities and Exchanges Commission is to 
“[p]rotect investors, [m]aintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, 
[and] [f]acilitate capital formation.”31 When protecting investors, 
however, it does not protect them from making bad investment 
decisions. It merely protects them from making uninformed 
investment decisions. The government is not in the business of 
judging which companies will succeed and which will fail, but it 
does force companies to disclose enough information so that 
investors can make that judgment themselves.32 
A familiarity with the SEC’s regulations makes it easier to 
understand why developers of blockchain applications would 
prefer to avoid the SEC’s jurisdiction, or at least not be subject to 
the SEC’s jurisdiction forever. 
A. Registration and Reporting Requirements 
The SEC imposes reporting requirements on companies that 
issue securities. Before issuing securities, a company must register 
these securities with the SEC by filing a Form S-1.33 A Form S-1 
requires a huge amount of information, such as the company’s 
geographical location, how much money it is asking for, how much 
money it has, who its officers are, how much its officers are paid, 
what kind of investments it is asking for, and much more. The 
company must also submit professionally audited financial 
statements.34 Registration requirements must be completed before 
the company can offer any securities.35 
Even after registering the securities, the SEC requires 
companies to continue filing reports. Once a year, the company 
must file a Form 10-K, which contains much of the same 
	
 31.  The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/basics/role-sec (last visited Dec. 6, 2018). 
 32.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Recommendation for Federal Supervision of Investment 
Securities in Interstate Commerce, U. OF MICH. DIGITAL LIBR. (Mar. 29, 1933), 
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4925381.1933.001/123. 
 33.  Form S-1: Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-1.pdf. 
 34.  What is a Registration Statement?, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/ 
goingpublic/registrationstatement (last modified Nov. 29, 2017). 
 35.  15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012). 
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information as the initial Form S-1.36 Additionally, the reporting 
company must file a form 10-Q every quarter.37 These reporting 
requirements last indefinitely, until the company has significantly 
shrunk in terms of shareholders or value.38 
In certain cases, the SEC allows companies to comply with a 
reduced set of reporting requirements. For example, smaller 
companies39 and emerging growth companies40 do not have to 
include quite as much information in their initial registrations or in 
their annual and quarterly reports. These companies do not have to 
provide as many narrative disclosures or data about executive 
compensation, and they only have to provide two years of financial 
statements instead of three. They also have some leniency when it 
comes to following certain accounting standards for their financial 
statements. However, there is usually a cap on the maximum value 
of a company that can qualify as a small business or an emerging 
growth company.41 
The regulations and requirements imposed by the SEC can be 
crucially helpful for investors, but they can also cut against many 
of the values of blockchain companies and the perceived benefits of 
initial coin offerings. One of the unique benefits of an ICO is that it 
requires very little money to get off the ground. Theoretically, it 
only takes a genius idea clearly described in a PDF. But complying 
with SEC requirements takes an immense amount of time and 
resources.42 Reporting companies typically need to hire accountants 
	
 36.  Form 10-K: Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf. The Form 10-K’s 
estimated average burden hours per response is 2395 hours. 
 37.  Form 10-Q, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/files/form10-q.pdf. The Form 10-Q’s 
estimated average burden hours per response is 190 hours. 
 38.  In general, a reporting company is only allowed to cease filing reports once a) it 
has fewer than 300 shareholders or b) it has fewer than 500 shareholders and the company’s 
assets have been worth less than ten million for three years. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (2018). 
 39.  17 C.F.R. § 229.10(f) (2018). See also, Smaller Reporting Companies, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/SRC (last modified July 24, 2019). 
 40.  15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19) (2012). See also, Emerging Growth Companies, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/EGC (last modified July 24, 2019). 
 41.  A smaller reporting company maintains its status as long as it has a public value 
of less than $250 million or annual revenues of less than $100 million. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(f)(1). 
An emerging growing company cannot exceed $700 million in public value or $1.07 billion 
in annual revenues. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19). 
 42.  The SEC estimates that the forms S-1, 10-K, and 10-Q take 671, 2395, and 190 hours 
to complete, respectively. Form S-1, SEC, supra note 33; Form 10-K, SEC, supra note 36; Form 
10-Q, SEC, supra note 37. 
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and lawyers to prepare and audit the reports, which can get 
extremely expensive. Start-up companies may have difficulty 
finding the time or employees needed to round up all the 
information that needs to be disclosed. Even the slightly reduced 
requirements for small businesses and emerging growth 
companies would be comparatively hefty for a blockchain 
company considering an ICO. 
B. Exemptions 
Because Congress and the SEC understand how laborious 
registration and reporting requirements can be, they have  
provided some exemptions to the rules.43 These exemptions vary  
in investment limitations, reporting requirements, and  
holding restrictions. 
The most common exemption is Regulation D, which exempts 
companies who are raising less than $5 million or are issuing just a 
small number of securities.44 The SEC allows these exempt 
companies to file extremely lightweight reports at registration, and 
they do not require ongoing reports.45 The caveat, however, is that 
these companies either cannot advertise their offerings to the 
general public,46 or must take measures to ensure that only 
accredited investors are buying their securities.47 “Accredited 
investors” are those that have a net worth of over $1 million or have 
an annual income exceeding $200,000.48 Additionally, Regulation D 
imposes holding requirements on the securities, meaning that those 
who purchase them may not resell them for at least six month or a 
	
 43.  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides numerous exemptions to the 
registration requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012). Furthermore, it gives the SEC broad 
discretionary power to create more exemptions. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012). 
 44.  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500–.506 (2018). 
 45.  Id. See also, Form D: Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf. 
 46.  This is known as a “private placement” or a Rule 506(b) exemption., Private 
Placements – Rule 506(b), SEC, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/ 
rule506b (last modified July 12, 2019). 
 47.  This is a Rule 506(c) exemption. General Solicitation – Rule 506(c), SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/rule506c (last modified July  
12, 2019). 
 48.  17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2018). 
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year, depending on how much information the issuing company is 
publicly disclosing.49 
Regulation Crowdfunding is a newer exemption, created as 
part of the JOBS Act in 2012.50 This regulation does not impose 
restrictions on who can purchase the securities or to whom the 
company can market its offering, but it prohibits raising more than 
roughly $1 million in any given year and restricts the resale of 
securities for one year.51 
Regulation A is another exemption which was updated and 
expanded with the JOBS Act.52 It allows companies to raise up to 
$50 million and places no restrictions on the resale of securities.53 
As a tradeoff, however, it requires more detailed disclosures, 
including audited financial statements and ongoing reports.54 
Blockchain developers would love to qualify for an exemption, 
but even exemptions may not be practical for their needs. 
Exemptions come with a strict limit on the amount of funds that can 
be raised, and ICOs typically aim to raise well beyond that limit. 
While the limits are helpful for a company that wants to start small 
and grow larger, the unique decentralized goal of blockchain 
developers is often the opposite: they want to start with a globally 
functioning network and then play a smaller and smaller role as the 
decentralized network takes off. Therefore, blockchain companies 
often shoot for large initial investments of capital, which disqualify 
them for the SEC’s exemptions. 
Even if a blockchain company’s capital requirements are small 
enough that it could qualify under an exemption, the exemptions 
also include other restrictions that are intolerable for most projects, 
especially ones that will use utility tokens. The tokens sold in 
exchange for investment usually have some functions, such as 
providing an ability to post content on a website or being 
redeemable for certain services or goods. Developers want these 
tokens to be accessible to anyone and freely tradable among users. 
	
 49.  Id. § 230.144(d). 
 50.  15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–
106, Title III, 126 Stat. 306, 315-323 (2012). 
 51.  17 C.F.R. § 227; see also SEC, Regulation Crowdfunding, https://www.sec.gov/ 
smallbusiness/exemptofferings/regcrowdfunding (last modified July 12, 2019). 
 52.  15 U.S.C. § 77c(b). 
 53.  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263. 
 54.  Id.; see also SEC, Regulation A, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/ 
exemptofferings/rega (last modified July 12, 2019). 
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Some of the exemptions, however, would restrict token sales to 
only wealthy investors55 or prohibit token holders from exchanging 
their tokens.56 
Obviously, security regulations only apply to agreements that 
are securities. If tokens created in ICOs were classified as non-
securities, then they could be freely bought and exchanged 
regardless of the onerous registration and reporting requirements. 
That would be the ideal scenario for blockchain projects using 
utility tokens, which are meant to be consumed and often look 
starkly different from the stocks that are traditionally imagined 
when one thinks of a security. The question is whether the law’s 
definition of a security is broad enough to cover utility tokens on a 
blockchain application. 
III.  DEFINING A SECURITY: THE HOWEY TEST AND OTHERS 
The Securities Act of 1933 contains a very lengthy list of 
instruments that count as securities.57 While most items on that list 
are specific and more obvious, such as stocks and bonds, the list 
also contains terms that are much more general, such as 
“investment contracts.” These broader terms serve as a catch-all for 
“[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular devices” that may act as 
securities.58 Due to the novel nature of digital coins, courts and the 
SEC have scrutinized whether digital coins are investment 
contracts. There are two main tests for defining investment 
contracts: the Howey test and the risk capital test. 
A. The Howey Test 
The seminal case interpreting what constitutes an investment 
contract is SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.59 In Howey, the investors 
purchased trees in an orange grove and then executed a service 
contract with the seller’s company.60 The company would cultivate, 
	
 55.  For example, Regulation D restricts sales to accredited investors. See supra text 
accompanying notes 44–49. 
 56.  Almost all exemptions restrict the resale of securities. SEC, Overview of  
Exemptions, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/exemptofferingschart 
(last modified Feb. 12, 2019). 
 57.  15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
 58.  SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). 
 59.  SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
 60.  Id. at 295–96. 
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harvest, and market the oranges on behalf of the purchasers, and 
then the company would share the profits with the purchasers.61 
The purchasers were predominantly business professionals who 
had no interest in oranges, nor the skill necessary to cultivate the 
oranges.62 Instead, they had been attracted by the promise of strong 
annual returns.63 
The Supreme Court determined that this arrangement was an 
investment contract and thus a security.64 Even though it was 
nominally just a real estate contract and a services agreement, the 
Court ignored the names and types of instruments and focused on 
the “economic reality” of the situation.65 Instead, the Court defined 
an investment contract as “a contract, transaction, or scheme 
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and  
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or  
a third party.”66 This definition, now known as the Howey test, can 
be broken into four distinct elements: (1) investment of money, (2) 
a common enterprise, (3) expectation of profits, and (4) efforts  
of others. 
1. Investment of money 
The first element of the Howey test is whether there was an 
investment of money. Although the original test specifically used 
the term “money,” subsequent court decisions have determined 
that other contributions of value besides cash can satisfy this prong 
of the test. For example, investments of services, labor, or property 
can be qualifying investments.67 Courts have also found that 
investments of bitcoin count as investments of money.68 This first 
element is often the least disputed element of the Howey test. 
	
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 296. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 299. 
 65.  Id. at 298. 
 66.  Id. at 298–99. 
 67.  See, e.g., Popovice v. Milides, 11 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (“[S]everal 
courts have held that an agreement exchanging services for stock constitutes a ‘sale’ under 
the Securities Exchange Act . . . .”). 
 68.  SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013); see also 
United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Bitcoin clearly qualifies  
as money . . . .”). 
005.MAUGHAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/20  12:43 PM 
1113 Utility Token Offerings 
	 1127 
	
2. A common enterprise 
The second factor in the Howey test is whether there is a 
common enterprise into which money is invested. The Supreme 
Court has not offered its opinion on how a common enterprise 
should be defined, but the circuit courts have adopted three main 
theories: horizontal commonality, broad vertical commonality, and 
narrow vertical commonality.69 
Horizontal commonality focuses on the relationships between 
the investors, and it is usually found in an enterprise that pools all 
of the investors’ contributions.70 In these enterprises, investors 
proportionally share all profits and losses,71 and the fortune of each 
investor is tied to the enterprise’s overall success.72 Horizontal 
commonality considers whether the value of the investors’ 
investments rise and fall together. 
Vertical commonality focuses on the relationships between 
investors and the promoter, and it may be found even when one 
investor’s fortune is entirely independent from the fortune of 
another.73 Vertical commonality comes in two variations: broad and 
narrow. Broad vertical commonality is found when an investor’s 
gains or losses depend on the efficacy of the promoter.74 If the 
investor makes money when the promoter makes good choices or 
loses money when the promoter makes poor choices, courts will 
find broad vertical commonality. 
Narrow vertical commonality is found when the investor’s 
gains or losses depend on the fortune of the promoter.75 If the 
investor makes money when the promoter makes money or loses 
money when the promoter loses money, courts will find narrow 
vertical commonality. 
	
 69.  James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 59, 71–76 (2011); Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common 
Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2152–63 (1995). 
 70.  SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212 F.3d 180, 187–88 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Horizontal 
commonality is characterized by ‘a pooling of investors’ contributions and distribution of 
profits and losses on a pro-rata basis among investors.’”). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See, e.g., Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 73.  SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 74.  See, e.g., SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1199–200 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 75.  See, e.g., Revak, 18 F.3d at 88; SEC v. Eurobond Exch., Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1340–41 
(9th Cir. 1994). 
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The circuit courts are all over the map when it comes to 
deciding which theory to apply. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuits look for horizontal commonality, while the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits require broad vertical commonality.76 The other 
circuits have either accepted one theory without ruling on the 
others, accepted multiple theories, or rejected the traditional 
theories for a more wholistic approach.77 
3. Expectation of profits 
The third factor in the Howey test is whether there was an 
expectation of profits by the person who invested money in a 
common enterprise. Examples of “profits” include earnings that 
result from the use of the investment78 and appreciation in value 
that results from the development of the investment.79 The Supreme 
Court has noted that these two examples are not the only types of 
profits that can qualify an investment as a security.80 
Even if an investor’s purchase will generate a profit, there needs 
to be an expectation of that profit in order to satisfy this prong of the 
Howey test. For example, when investors bought apartments and 
received stock in a cooperative housing community that 
subsequently appreciated, the purchase of the housing was not a 
security because “investors were attracted solely by the prospect of 
acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns on their 
investments.”81 But if the investors had bought the apartments 
along with a contract for management, housekeeping, or 
development of those condos, then the investments might have 
been securities.82 
	
 76.  James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 59, 68 (2011). 
 77.  Id. at 68–69. 
 78.  See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338–39 (1967) (finding an expectation 
of profits where promoter gave dividends based on the promoter’s profits). 
 79.  See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351–53 (1943) (finding an 
expectation of profits where promoter of lease agreed to drill exploratory oil wells on  
the land). 
 80.  SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 396 (2004). 
 81.  United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975). 
 82.  See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1460–62 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (finding 
that the purchase of a Hawaiian condominium could be a security because the buyer 
depended on others’ management of the condo). 
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A motivation to use the item purchased does not preclude the 
finding that the investment included an expectation of profits. In 
some cases, the motivation to use the item may coexist with an 
expectation of profits. For example, a court found that partnership 
programs allowing for annual vacations at a resort were securities 
because the promotional materials also stressed the economic 
benefits of the programs.83 Despite testimony of some purchasers 
that their primary motivation was to stay at the resort, the court 
determined that other purchasers were likely induced by the 
profitable investment opportunity.84 
This Supreme Court has described this as a difference of 
investment versus consumption.85 If the purpose of the purchase is 
to make money, then it is an investment that satisfies the 
expectation-of-profits prong of the Howey test. If the purpose of the 
purchase is simply to consume or use the product purchased, then 
it is not a security.86 
 4. Efforts of others 
The fourth and final factor of the Howey test is whether the 
expectation of profits derives from the efforts of others. The original 
wording of the test required the profits to come “solely” from the 
efforts of the promoter or a third party, but circuit courts 
subsequently dropped the strict requirement because it was too 
inflexible and allowed well-crafted schemes to circumvent 
securities law by having the investors perform some nominal 
work.87 Realistically, many investment schemes that should plainly 
qualify as securities involve at least some efforts by the investors 
themselves, including investments that were featured in cases that 
the Howey court originally cited.88 
	
 83.  Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 987–89 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 689 (1985) (“Applying the Howey 
test, we concluded that the instruments likewise were not ‘securities’ by virtue of being 
‘investment contracts’ because the economic realities of the transaction showed that the 
purchasers had parted with their money not for the purpose of reaping profits from  
the efforts of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for  
personal consumption.”). 
 86.  United Housing Found., 421 U.S. at 853. 
 87.  SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479–83 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 88.  Id. 
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This interpretation leaves open the question of how much effort 
by others satisfies this prong of the Howey test. Courts have 
approached this question from two different viewpoints. 
Some courts primarily analyze the promoter’s role, asking 
whether the efforts of the promoter (or other third parties) are 
“undeniably significant” or are “essential managerial efforts which 
affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”89 If so, those efforts 
will satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey test. 
Some other courts focus on the role of the investors themselves. 
If the investors exert very little control over the whole enterprise 
into which they are investing their money, or if they have no 
practical way of affecting its success or failure, then their 
investment is likely a security. On the other hand, if the investors 
have significant duties or perform significant work that affects the 
success of the enterprise, then the courts will not find their 
investments to be securities.90 
In addition to examining who made the efforts, some courts 
place emphasis on when the efforts were made. In a case involving 
the sale of existing life insurance policies, the D.C. Circuit held that 
the instruments were not investment contracts because the value of 
the promoter’s efforts were incorporated into the purchase price 
and because no one was expected to make further efforts to increase 
their value.91 A majority of courts, however, still place some  
weight on pre-purchase efforts, because “investment schemes may 
often involve a combination of both pre- and post-purchase 
managerial activities.”92 
B. The Risk Capital Test 
The SEC and the federal courts use the Howey test to determine 
whether an instrument is an investment contract, but that is not the 
only test that is used. An alternative test is the risk capital test.  
This test was first articulated by the California Supreme Court93 and 
	
 89.  SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482–83 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 90.  Steinhardt Grp., Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 152–55 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 91.  SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 92.  SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 743–44 (11th Cir. 2005). See also The 
Cardozo Blockchain Project, Not so Fast – Risks Related to the Use of a “SAFT” for Token Sales,  
LARC (Nov. 21, 2017), https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/blockchain-project-reports/1/. 
 93.  Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961). 
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has since been adopted by several other states via judicial action or 
legislation.94 
Instead of considering whether an investor depends on others 
to make profits, the risk capital test focuses on whether the investor 
depends on others to not lose the investment. Like the Howey test, 
the risk capital test can be stated in a four-part test:95 (1) the investor 
provides initial value to the enterprise, (2) the initial value is subject 
to the risks of the enterprise, (3) the initial value is induced by 
representations that the investor will realize additional substantial 
benefit, and (4) the investor does not exercise practical and 
managerial control over the enterprise. 
There are a few differences between the risk capital test and the 
Howey test. First, the risk capital test contains no requirement of a 
“common enterprise,” so a nonpooled investment can be a security 
even if there is no vertical commonality between the investor and 
the promoter.96 Second, the risk capital test looks for a broader 
material benefit instead of an expectation of profits, meaning 
investments that provide significant financial benefits along with 
consumptive uses can be securities.97 
Federal courts should primarily use the Supreme Court’s 
definition of investment contracts, which makes the Howey test 
most likely to govern questions about the SEC’s jurisdiction and the 
reach of its regulations. But it is important to remember that 
organizations selling securities to raise capital also have to comply 
with blue sky laws, or securities laws specific to the state of the 
purchasers. Thus, if an instrument is a non-security under the 
Howey test but a security under the risk capital test, it could still 
violate the laws of states that apply the risk capital test. 
The Howey test and the risk capital test, both of which determine 
what counts as a security, have each been around for several 
decades. But in recent years, judges and SEC officials have had the 
	
 94.  E.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Haw. 1971); State ex rel. Healy  
v. Consumer Bus. Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549 (Or. Ct. App. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE  
§ 21.20.005 (2011). 
 95.  Hawaii Mkt. Ctr, Inc., 485 P.2d at 109. See also Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic Realities 
of a “Security”: Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367, 377 (1967). 
 96.  See, e.g., King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314, 322–23 (Tenn. 2002) (finding that an 
instrument can be a security under the risk capital test even if there is no common enterprise). 
 97.  E.g., Silver Hills Country Club, 361 P.2d at 908–09 (finding that the use of a country 
club was a material benefit for which investors risked their capital). 
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difficult task of applying these tests to the brand-new financial 
instrument of digital assets. 
IV. TOKENS DURING AN ICO: ARE THEY SECURITIES? 
When Jay Clayton, Chairman of the SEC, was called to speak 
before Congress in February 2018, he succinctly captured the 
prevailing view on whether tokens released in ICOs are securities: 
“I believe every ICO I’ve seen is a security . . . .”98 In a sense, it is 
unsurprising that the federal government has determined that 
ICOs are securities offerings, since even the name, Initial Coin 
Offering, is fashioned after the prototypical securities offering, 
Initial Public Offering. Although the specifics of each offering will 
differ, it is unlikely that a digital asset sold before its corresponding 
network becomes functional will escape securities regulations.99 
A. Application of the Howey Test 
The legal analysis for classifying an ICO as a security is a 
straightforward application of the Howey test. First, because 
investors are giving dollars, bitcoin, and other valuable currencies 
to the developers in exchange for their promised tokens, ICOs 
present a clear investment of money. 
Second, ICOs involve a common enterprise regardless of which 
version of commonality is preferred. Horizontal commonality is 
found because developers pool the investments, and the value of 
each investor’s tokens rises and falls together. There is broad 
vertical commonality, because an investor’s promised tokens have 
zero worth until developers effectively create a functioning 
network, as well as narrow vertical commonality because the value 
of an investor’s tokens will mirror the value of the developers’ 
tokens that they have kept for themselves—meaning that the 
investors’ and the developers’ fortunes are tied together. While a 
company theoretically could give away all of its tokens at an ICO 
	
 98.  Stan Higgins, SEC Chief Clayton: ‘Every ICO I’ve Seen Is a Security’, COINDESK  
(Feb. 6, 2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-clayton-every-ico-ive- 
seen-security. 
 99.  For a very narrow example of a how a digital asset might be presold without 
implicating securities law, see Julie E. Krosnicki, Can a Future Network’s Token Be “Presold” 
and Not Qualify as an Investment Contract?, COIN CENTER (Nov. 7, 2018), https:// 
coincenter.org/entry/can-a-future-network-s-token-be-presold-and-not-qualify-as-an-
investment-contract. 
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and not have its own fortunes tied to the fortune of its tokenholders, 
companies almost always reserve a significant portion of tokens as 
a way to compensate their employees, reserve capital for future 
improvements, or slowly release tokens into the market as a way of 
supporting the token’s value. 
Third, there is an expectation of profits. Because no functioning 
product is established at the time of an ICO, consumptive use of the 
token is not possible. Investors at this point of the operation buy the 
tokens because they believe the token will increase in value after a 
functioning product is complete. Even purchasers who truly want 
to spend the tokens or participate in the network are induced to 
invest early through discounts or other unique benefits. Without an 
expectation of a special profit, users would simply wait until the 
platform was functional before buying tokens. 
Fourth, any profits clearly come from the efforts of others. 
During an ICO, the tokens that investors receive for their money 
are worth nothing because no actual product exists yet. Any profits 
will necessarily come from the efforts of the developers who create 
the product. The efforts of those developers are both significant and 
essential to the success of the blockchain network. Furthermore, the 
investors will not be writing the code and will not be able to 
exercise any control over the final success of the network. 
B. Decisions by the SEC and the Courts 
Both the SEC and multiple federal courts have endorsed this 
analysis. In 2017, the SEC published its report on a blockchain 
network called “The DAO,” where it asserted that most ICOs are 
securities offerings.100 Not long after, the SEC issued a cease-and-
desist letter to a company called Munchee, a blockchain network 
for restaurant reviews.101 Munchee intended to develop a project 
where users could rate restaurants and receive tokens for their 
reviews, which could then be redeemed at participating 
restaurants. After Munchee raised a significant amount of money 
at its ICO, the SEC stepped in and warned Munchee that it had 
conducted an illegal, unregistered securities offering.102 
	
 100.  Report of Investigation, supra note 12. 
 101.  SEC, Munchee Inc., supra note 12. 
 102.  Id.; see also Matthew J. Higgins, supra note 30, at 222–28. 
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Courts have also supported the idea that ICOs are security 
offerings. Although there have not been many cases to date in the 
short history of ICOs, the Eastern District of New York addressed 
the issue in the context of a criminal charge for a fraudulent ICO.103 
In the court’s analysis, the ICO satisfied all four prongs of the Howey 
test and was therefore a security.104 
Backed by that administrative and judicial guidance, the SEC 
has begun to crack down on unregistered ICOs. In November 2018, 
the Enforcement Section of the SEC identified unregistered 
offerings by blockchain companies as one of its largest priorities, 
stating that it had opened a large number of cases against 
companies that had conducted ICOs since the SEC’s first report on 
the subject.105 Later that month, the SEC revealed its first official 
enforcement actions against ICOs, such as the settlement with 
Airfox discussed in Part I.106 
According to its initial enforcement actions, the SEC has 
implied that blockchain companies whose ICOs are found to be 
securities will be subject to the reporting requirements until the 
current law permits the companies to stop.107 This makes sense for 
traditional firms, who typically grow larger and more influential as 
their securities increase in quantity and value. However, 
blockchain programs are based on a different business model. 
Blockchain developers try to eliminate large centralized 
organizations, not become one. And the utility tokens that they 
issue are also different from typical securities, in that they can be 
used for purposes other than just staking a claim to future cash 
flows. As a result, proponents of blockchain technologies have 
raised another important question: Even if a utility token issued 
during an ICO starts out as a security, can that same token ever 
eventually become a non-security? 
	
 103.  United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 (RJD), 2018 WL 4346339, at *11–23 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018). 
 104.  Id. Contra SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB(BLM), 2018 WL 6181408 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2018). In the preliminary holding of this securities fraud case, a different 
judge found that the SEC had not proven that tokens sold during an ICO were securities. 
Based on the defendant’s assertion that the thirty-two investors were acquaintances and 
were merely “testers” of the token, the SEC could not prove, at summary judgement 
proceedings, that there was an expectation of profits. Id. at *15–22. 
 105.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T ANNUAL REPORT, 7–8, 15–16 (2018). 
 106.  Airfox Order, supra note 9. 
 107.  Id. at 9; Paragon, supra note 11. 
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V.  TOKENS AFTER AN ICO: CAN A SECURITY  
BECOME A NON-SECURITY? 
It makes sense that a token was a security when it was issued in 
an ICO, long before there was any working blockchain network. 
But once the network is developed and working, a number of legal 
and policy-based arguments support that continued securities 
regulation might be inapplicable, unnecessary, and detrimental. 
These arguments suggest a token can transform from a security into 
a non-security once it crosses a certain line. 
There are at least two theories for how this line should be 
drawn. The first is based on functionality: digital assets on a 
blockchain network that is sufficiently functional should not be 
securities. The second is based on decentralization: digital assets on 
a blockchain network that is sufficiently decentralized should not 
be securities. This Part considers the legal and policy-based 
arguments for how and why these lines should be drawn. 
A. Drawing a Line Based on Functionality 
The functionality theory is based on the idea that, even though 
the tokens purchased from promoters before they actually develop 
the blockchain network might qualify as securities, the tokens that 
are purchased after the network has gone live would not pass the 
Howey test and thus should not be considered securities. This 
theory  applies to utility tokens, or tokens that users buy primarily 
for consumption instead of speculation. 
This approach is embodied in the Simple Agreement for Tokens 
(SAFT) framework that was proposed in 2017.108 The SAFT 
agreement provides for blockchain developers to hold legally 
compliant ICOs by selling tokens as securities to accredited 
investors (thus qualifying for a Regulation D exemption to 
registration) prior to developing the network. Once the network is 
functional, both the company and the initial investors would be 
able to sell their tokens to network users as non-securities. The SEC 
	
 108.  Juan Batiz-Benet et al., The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale  
Framework, PROTOCOL LABS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-
Whitepaper.pdf. 
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has been reluctant to give the SAFT its blessing, preferring to 
consider all tokens on a case-by-case basis.109 
1. Expectation of profits and functionality 
Functional tokens might not satisfy the Howey test’s 
“expectation of profits” requirement. Unlike pre-functionality 
purchasers who buy tokens at a discount with hopes that they will 
gain value, post-functionality purchasers buy tokens because they 
want to redeem the tokens for some service or gain access to some 
rights associated with the tokens.110 This is more analogous to the 
purchase of housing units: although they might appreciate, the 
purchasers expect to use them, not profit from them. 
But the ability to use tokens does not automatically mean that 
there is no expectation of profits. There are two types of people who 
purchase tokens: those that want to participate in the network, and 
those that want to make money off the token’s anticipated 
appreciation.111 As was the case with partnership programs that 
provided stays at a vacation resort, the presence of speculative 
investors may be enough to find an expectation of profits.112 Even 
in Howey, the sale of services contracts along with the land 
constituted a securities offering, even though some people bought 
the land without the services contract.113 
Additionally, it is likely that users who buy the tokens 
predominantly for participation rights or consumptive uses will 
also have hopes of profiting from their investments. That  
secondary expectation of profits would still qualify the utility token 
as a security.114 
The argument that the expectation of profits is replaced with a 
motivation of consumption means that the functional theory can 
only apply to utility tokens. Security tokens that give the holder a 
	
 109.  Hinman, supra note 16 (commenting, in speech’s footnote 15, that the SAFT cannot 
be considered in the abstract and that legal analysis must follow the particular facts of  
an offering). 
 110.  Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 54; see also Batiz-Benet et al.., supra note 108,  
at 9–10. 
 111.  Batiz-Benet et al., supra note 108, at 1. 
 112.  See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 113.  SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1946). 
 114.  Laura Gritz, Teaching a New Dog Old Tricks: Why the Howey Test Is Still the SEC’s 
Best Friend When Examining Initial Coin Offerings, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 193,  
205–06 (2018). 
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right to share in the network’s profits, on the other hand, are much 
more likely to present an expectation of profits.115 Because tokens 
can be very versatile, a token that has functions typical of a utility 
token could also have rewards typical of a security token.116 
 2. Efforts of others and functionality 
Functional tokens might not satisfy the Howey test’s “efforts of 
others” requirement, either. Even if some investors buy the token 
solely for capital appreciation, securities regulators would need to 
show that that expectation of profits comes from the efforts  
of others. But the developers’ efforts may not be “undeniably 
significant” nor “essential” once the blockchain network  
is functional. 
The post-functionality efforts of developers may not be 
sufficiently significant to bring about profits because appreciation 
of a token’s value is a result of external factors and not the 
developers’ efforts.117 Once the network is functional, developers 
have completed the lion’s share of the work. While they may make 
some additional improvements or tweaks to the network, those 
small efforts will not affect the value of the tokens nearly as much 
as supply and demand, government action, public sentiment, and 
other events over which neither the investor nor the promoter  
has any control.118 Because the external factors predominate  
the fluctuations in the token’s value, the developers’ efforts are  
not significant.119 
In a similar vein, post-functionality efforts of developers may 
not be essential to the success of the enterprise. A functioning 
blockchain network using utility tokens facilitates direct 
transactions between participants of the network, without the 
developers’ intervention. Although the developers’ efforts were 
essential in creating the network, they are not necessary for others 
to use the network. 
	
 115.  Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 44. 
 116.  Over a quarter of all tokens offer a right to profits. Saman Adhami et al., Why do 
Businesses Go Crypto? An Empirical Analysis of Initial Coin Offerings, SSRN , at 3 (Jan. 6, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3046209. 
 117.  Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 54–55. 
 118.  Batiz-Benet et al., supra note 108, at 9–10. 
 119.  It may be the users, rather than the developers, who are contributing to the 
application’s increasing value by their participation. Crosser, supra note 25, at 414–15. 
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In reality, however, it may be too simplistic to say that all of the 
developers’ significant and essential efforts took place before the 
network was functional. It can be difficult to define exactly when 
the network is considered “functional.” The developers may 
release a beta version to some testers, followed by a full version to 
the public.120 Even after the public version, the developers will 
continue maintaining or improving the system. These post-
functionality efforts might simply include tweaking the user 
interface or changing maximum transaction limits, but the network 
might also require large updates. Developers might patch a security 
vulnerability, change the underlying method for verifying 
transactions, or advertise the application to a new market of 
potential users. These common occurrences could count as 
significant efforts. 
Additionally, the presence of external factors does not make the 
developers’ efforts “undeniably significant,” even if those external 
factors powerfully affect the value of the token. While those factors 
might influence the value of a digital token, they also substantially 
affect the value of any security. The value of a corporation’s stock 
might depend much more on whether the market is crashing than 
if the board fails to cut certain costs, but those stocks are still 
securities. Similarly, the Howey test focuses on the efforts of the 
promoters regardless of what other factors affect the success of  
the enterprise. 
The post-functional efforts of developers might also be 
considered “essential” in the sense that a capitalistic economy 
requires that developers make continued improvements. All 
businesses need to adapt their goods and services to their 
consumers’ needs and preferences, including blockchain projects. 
If one project does not do so, a similar project might sweep in to 
address users’ unmet needs, drawing away those users in the 
process.121 The desertion of an unmaintained blockchain project 
would significantly harm the value of its tokens. Therefore, even a 
	
 120.  Cardozo Blockchain Project, supra note 92, at 8–9. 
 121.  There is already considerable competition between blockchain projects that are 
trying to serve (or supplant) the same industry. For example, at least seven different tokens 
are already being used to create decentralized prediction markets. Steve Walters, 7 Best 
Crypto Prediction Markets: Betting on the Blockchain, COIN BUREAU (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.coinbureau.com/blockchain/crypto-prediction-markets/. 
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developer’s seemingly minor efforts might be “essential” to survive 
in a competitive marketplace. 
Lastly, some courts downplay the distinction between pre-
functionality efforts and post-functionality efforts.122 Token holders 
rely on the blockchain application for their tokens to have any 
value, and that blockchain application would not exist without the 
past efforts of the developers. Although some courts might 
consider those past efforts irrelevant to the Howey analysis because 
they are baked into the purchase price of the tokens,123 most courts 
have declined to draw a line between pre-functionality efforts and 
post-functionality efforts.124 The latter courts might even analyze a 
developer’s efforts that occurred during the ICO. The primary 
focus is on the nature and significance of the developer’s 
managerial efforts, not the timing. 
B.  Drawing a Line Based on Decentralization 
Another line for determining when a token has crossed from a 
security to a non-security is the line of decentralization. This theory 
applies to blockchain projects where the original developers are no 
longer playing the sole or primary role in the maintenance of the 
application. Often, these decentralized projects are older and  
more established. 
A prime example of a project that grew decentralized is 
Ethereum. In 2013, the Ethereum Foundation held a pre-sale (the 
precursor to the ICO) to raise money to create a blockchain network 
which would support smart (or self-executing) contracts.125 
Although the Ethereum Foundation created the initial functioning 
network, the network is now maintained by dozens of different, 
unaffiliated developers.126 These “core developers” hold regular 
meetings to discuss potential improvements and changes, and they 
make their contributions to the network’s code just as they would 
to any other open-source software project. When Director Hinman 
	
 122.  Cardozo Blockchain Project, supra note 92, at 8–9. 
 123.  E.g., SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 124.  See supra Section IV.A.4. 
 125.  Vitalik Buterin, Launching the Ether Sale, ETHEREUM BLOG (July 22, 2014), 
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/22/launching-the-ether-sale/. 
 126.  E.g., Ethereum, Project Management: Meeting Notes and Agenda Times, GITHUB, 
https://github.com/ethereum/pm (listing the contributors to the Ethereum codebase and 
their meetings) (last visited Oct. 21, 2019). 
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gave his June 2018 speech on digital assets, he suggested that ether 
was too decentralized to be a security.127 
A main idea behind the decentralization theory is that a 
decentralized blockchain project does not have a sole organization 
that profits off the project or exerts all the managerial efforts. 
Applying securities law would add little value, since there is no 
central entity that could make all of the SEC’s required 
disclosures.128 Accordingly, a decentralized blockchain project 
might not satisfy all the elements of the Howey test. 
1. A common enterprise and decentralization 
A decentralized blockchain project is less likely to be a 
“common enterprise.” For courts that look for horizontal 
commonality, there must be a pooling of funds. Although pooling 
is evident during the initial fundraising, it is harder to prove once 
the tokens have been distributed across the network. When a user 
purchases a token, his or her money could be going to any other 
user (or speculator) on the network. Because the funds are spread 
out between so many different, unaffiliated parties, there might not 
be any real pooling of those funds.129 
Similarly, there might not be any vertical commonality in a 
decentralized blockchain network because there is no single entity 
to which the users’ fortunes are tied.130 The value of the tokens on a 
decentralized network may depend more on the network’s other 
participants than on the network’s developers.131 Even if developers 
are still making changes to the application, those developers might 
be completely different from the ones who created the system in the 
first place. Additionally, they might be a large, unaffiliated group 
of programmers who make individual contributions to the code. 
Their contributions might be more or less helpful, and they might 
have more or less personal stake in the blockchain. It is difficult to 
say that the fortunes of all users are tied to the efficacy or fortunes 
of a disjointed group of people. 
	
 127.  Hinman, supra note 16; see also supra Part I. 
 128.  Hinman, supra note 16. 
 129.  See Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 49–50. 
 130.  Id. at 52. 
 131.  Crosser, supra note 25, at 399–400. 
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Neither would there be vertical commonality between users 
and the blockchain network’s validators. Although users depend 
on validators to keep the blockchain current and accurate, the 
validators are not making decisions that affect the success of the 
enterprise; they are simply running the predetermined code that 
adds new transactions to the blockchain. Additionally, validators’ 
fortunes may not be correlated to the users’ fortunes. Because they 
get compensated for simply verifying transactions, regardless of 
whether the token value is trending upward or downward, they 
could potentially make money even as users lose money.132 
Despite the possibility that a blockchain may become so 
decentralized that it no longer forms a common enterprise, it is 
unlikely that many blockchain projects reach that point. It may be 
a long time before the original developers cede control of a project 
or invite other programmers to contribute to their project. In the 
meantime, there is a distinct affiliated group of developers and the 
worth of the users’ tokens are tied to the developers’ decisions. 
Additionally, the original developers usually keep a percentage of 
the tokens for themselves,133 further tying their fortunes to the 
users’ fortunes. Even for a more decentralized project that has new 
programmers contributing to its codebase, there may still be a clear 
group of “core developers” who are making decisions about the 
project and have a clear stake in its success. Continued reporting 
requirements from these core developers would still benefit 
potential investors. 
Even the network’s validators may not be so decentralized as to 
escape the definition of “a common enterprise.” While some 
consensus methods, such as proof-of-work, use competition to keep 
miners separate and unaffiliated, other methods are more 
conducive to finding centralization.134 In proof-of-stake validation, 
the people with the greatest stake in the network are the ones most 
likely to control and verify transactions (and receive an even larger 
	
 132.  See Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 51. 
 133.  It is common for developers to keep approximately 15% of all issued tokens for 
themselves. See, e.g., DR. SANJEEV VERMA ET. AL., MUNCHEE TOKEN: A DECENTRALIZED 
BLOCKCHAIN BASED FOOD REVIEW/RATING SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM 18 (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.theventurealley.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/12/Munchee-
White-Paper.pdf. 
 134.  Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 57–58. 
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stake for doing so).135 This leads to a cycle of increasing influence. 
It is possible that a group of the largest stakeholders could band 
together to decide which transactions get verified and when.136 This 
same centralization exists in a permissioned consensus system, 
where certain entities (such as the developers themselves) manage 
and verify all of the network’s transactions. These scenarios are not 
so decentralized that they make securities regulations inapplicable. 
It is also important to remember that commonality is required 
by the Howey test but not the risk capital test.137 Therefore, even if a 
federal court uses the Howey test to find that a digital asset lacks 
commonality and is not a security, a state court might subsequently 
determine that the very same digital asset is a security under the 
risk capital test. 
 2. Efforts of others and decentralization 
A decentralized blockchain may also not satisfy the Howey test’s 
requirement that any expected profits come from the “efforts of 
others.” A network may be so decentralized that there is no 
coherent group of people exerting “significant” or “essential” 
managerial efforts. 
Users rely on the efforts of validators to keep the blockchain 
functioning. As discussed in the context of commonality, there is an 
argument that the validators for decentralized blockchains are so 
diverse and unaffiliated that a user cannot be said to rely upon the 
efforts of any particular verifier to receive the expected profits.138 
This can be true for well-established, popular blockchains, such as 
Bitcoin or Ethereum, but many blockchains use methods of block 
validation that are far more likely to create a coherent group that 
exerts essential efforts. Either way, however, the act of verifying 
transactions may not be “managerial.” Validators are typically just 
running premade code and not making any decisions. 
The real decision-makers are the developers of the blockchain. 
The developers write the code to make small or large changes to the 
way the blockchain network functions. As discussed previously, 
	
 135.  Jake Frankenfield, Proof of Stake (PoS), INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 11, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proof-stake-pos.asp. 
 136.  Mohit Mamoria, Is Proof of Stake Really the Solution?, HACKER NOON, (Oct. 14, 2019), 
https://hackernoon.com/is-proof-of-stake-really-the-solution-2db68487f4ba. 
 137.  See supra Section IV.B. 
 138.  See, e.g., Hinman, supra note 16. 
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these efforts might be “significant” and “essential.” However, the 
decentralized line-drawing theory posits that there is no third party 
to which securities law could be helpfully applied and that 
securities law is unnecessary because of the decentralized 
network’s transparency.139 
Even if the current developers of a blockchain project are not 
the same as its original developers, there is still a limited, exclusive 
group of programmers running the system. Although any 
programmer can suggest changes to the code, only the core 
developers can make changes to the codebase. The core developers 
hold frequent meetings to discuss and debate the proposed 
changes.140 Just because these developers do not work for the same 
employer does not mean that they are unaffiliated or disjointed. 
They are the ones capable of making final decisions and exerting 
efforts that significantly affect the success of the whole project. 
The transparency of a blockchain system does not necessarily 
affect the analysis of a token under the Howey test. Even if users can 
inspect the open-source code on GitHub and watch the core 
developers’ meetings on YouTube (and even if they are capable of 
understanding the code and technical jargon), users are still relying 
on the efforts of those core developers. Looking at the blockchain 
project from the users’ perspective, they have no ability to affect its 
success. Users can suggest changes to the network, but they cannot 
make those changes nor exert any real control over the success of 
the network. Users are relying on the efforts of the core developers 
to keep their tokens functioning and appreciating. 
CONCLUSION 
In an increasingly digital world, blockchain technology 
presents the opportunity to make enormous improvements to the 
economy. The ability to conduct global transactions without 
requiring independent verification by a third party may completely 
transform e-commerce and other industries. The enthusiasm for the 
technology also brings uncertainty, as society grapples with how to 
unroll blockchain projects in a secure, moral, efficient, and effective 
manner. Those same concerns apply to how entrepreneurs raise the 
funds necessary to make their blockchain projects a reality. 
	
 139.  Van Valkenburgh, supra note 28, at 58. 
 140.  See Ethereum, supra note 126. 
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Securities regulators want investors to make informed, rational, 
and deliberate decisions before providing capital to blockchain 
projects. Entrepreneurs want investors to contribute large amounts 
of capital and to reap the benefits of being an early adopter of their 
blockchain project. Even if entrepreneurs concede that their ICOs 
are security offerings, they assert that perpetually regulating digital 
assets as securities would be unnecessary, unproductive, and 
overly burdensome. 
The debate over whether post-distribution digital tokens 
should always be securities has primarily consisted of using 
functionality or decentralization to draw lines between securities 
and non-securities: A token is no longer a security if it is  
sufficiently functional, or a token is no longer a security if it is 
sufficiently decentralized. 
This line-drawing presents two problems for blockchain 
advocates. First, the lines are blurry. It is hard to say how functional 
or how decentralized a blockchain project needs to be before 
crossing the line to become a non-security. Second, the lines are 
farther to the side of non-securities than many advocates would 
prefer; that is, the current securities laws make it very difficult for 
a blockchain project to cross the line from a security to a non-
security. While it may be possible, a vast majority of blockchain 
projects will never graduate to become non-securities. 
Full-fledged securities regulations would impose hefty burdens 
on blockchain developers and on token holders. As a result, 
developers would be forced to avoid conducting ICOs, foreclosing 
an effective way of raising funds that fittingly coincides with the 
unique purposes and principles of blockchain technologies. On the 
other hand, schemes that trigger securities law do so for a reason: 
there is usually a potential for investors to make poor, uninformed 
decisions that might have been avoided. 
These competing interests require a balance between 
technological innovation and investor protection. The question of 
whether digital tokens are securities is often discussed as a black-
and-white dichotomy, but that misses the point of a balance. A 
balance instead seeks for a gray area or a middle ground. 
The government is capable of striking a balance. The SEC has 
already carved out more lenient requirements for emerging growth 
companies, small businesses, and even crowdfunding. The SEC can 
also create a similar exception for digital assets. The formulation of 
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this special rule should consider the unique characteristics of digital 
assets, such as transparency of blockchain networks and the 
functional aspects of their associated tokens, when deciding what 
information developers can feasibly disclose and what information 
would be most helpful for potential investors. Although a detailed 
proposal of the ideal regulation is beyond the scope of this 
particular Note, a discussion about how to better regulate 
blockchain applications is already underway.141 
Applying a decades-old legal standard to a new technological 
innovation is not an easy task. Creative lawyers and judges are 
usually capable of squeezing a new subject matter into old laws, 
but that is not likely to achieve the optimal result. When it comes to 
blockchain networks and their associated digital assets, a 
thoughtfully crafted regulation would benefit developers, 
regulators, users, and investors. 
Scott W. Maughan* 
	  
	
 141.  For one proposal of a disclosure scheme for blockchain developers, see Tiffany L. 
Minks, Comment, Ethereum and the SEC: Why Most Distributed Autonomous Organizations Are 
Subject to the Registration Requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and a Proposal for New 
Regulation, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 405, 430–37 (2018). 
 *   J.D. candidate, April 2020, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. Thank you to my wife, Dana, for helping me put these ideas on paper. 
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